> Lie to congress?
I want to give a summary version of an argument that Clapper did not lie to Congress.
The original comment is in the June 10th, "Clapper: I Gave 'The Least Untruthful Answer' To Wyden's 'Beating Your Wife' Question On Data Surveillance". This argument asks and answers 5 questions related to that article.
*****
To Summarize the argument above that can get Clapper off the hook:
Q1: Did he lie to Congress?
No. He answered correctly the question he thought he was being asked, with "no, sir, not wittingly." It's not a lie unless it is untruthful and intentional.
Q2: Could Clapper possibly have thought that "any type of data at all on" Americans was not referring to meta-data but only to emails and the like?
Yes, according to the following reasonable interpretation of Wyden's question. Random unprocessed data in bulk does not constitute a dossier on anyone. The data must be specific and linked to a person to be considered data collected on that person.
An analogous situation supports this view. Filming and storing everything in front of your store does not mean you are collecting data on "Mike" if Mike happens to pass by. You would be collecting data on Mike only when you process the bulk data and link it appropriately with a person named "Mike".
Q3: Was the question about email?
If the meaning of a question need not be unique, then Clapper can have a good argument that it was about email.
Q4: Could Wyden be construed to have been asking a loaded question of the wife-beating variety?
Yes, because two different ways to interpret his question (while also interpreting it as referring to emails) exist yet each comes with the opposite answer. "No, sir, not wittingly" answers both of these interpretations. One interpretation is solely about the policy of the NSA. The other interpretation is about the achieved results of the collection process and would include errors.
Q5: Did Clapper admit to lying?
No. He never stated literally that he lied, and it would make no sense for him to admit to something that he likely believes is not true. He admitted to giving the best answer to a loaded question. He used the words "truthful" and "untruthful" but not "lie", which is a word that means something different.
*****
So this is why I ask about specific laws and policies. Many of the laws people want already exist even when we don't think they are being applied properly. Sometimes it is difficult to win a case.
I like math, so I will reply to that, but the main point is that a query result that gets deleted a minute later or a day later without any use being made of the data might leave an audit trail but be meaningless to the privacy of Americans. The important point is the totality of harm from those error queries and not their number.
As for the math, lots of queries are very repetitive in nature. That makes sense, but, as a check, we see that if not then we would have at least 8 million / .0001 = 80 billion Americans walking the planet. In other words, if an error is made once every 10,000 queries (assuming equal query size), then there would need to be at least 80 billion Americans for that ratio of bad queries to give 8 million (as you calculated) if there were no repeats in the query results.
I agree it was made in haste.
Keep in mind that the same fear government leaders had of being major targets to terrorist activity has not changed too much. Put new people in office and at some point they will realize the stakes to their well-being. Gov reps are larger targets than most people. Can a "few" people's privacy possibly be violated (as they see in their minds)?
"Yes, of course, absolutely" is how many might eventually feel even if they don't verbalize that to constituents or even if they suggest they believe the opposite.
> Accountability
Many agree with what you mentioned, but you give no details as to how you hope to overcome human failures. Many of those things are law today.
Also, you likely are judging public figures without the benefits of a due process trial. You should recognize that many of the people you think are guilty perhaps may not be. And of course, money and savviness plays a role in who gets off and who does not.
So, are you offering a better set of laws than our Constitution and current set of laws and regulations? That was my question, to see some specifics that presumably meet some shared objectives while overcoming the realities of human nature and overcoming the rest of our currently flawed body of laws that the new law or laws would be a part of. And I was focused on the NSA spying worries.
> No, but it does mean that the legal justifications being used need to be public, and challengeable.
OK that is sort of a specific that is currently not law and can be codified. But are you saying you want to destroy some attorney-client privileges? Many people, especially in power, act based on their goals and guidance from an attorney. Are you instead saying that if forced to defend themselves, that they wouldn't be able to use any other theory?
Of course, just asking for this would put lots of public pressure to behave in many cases, I think. If they didn't offer a good theory, their actions would look bad.
And then there is the case of classified information (like legal theories) so that terrorists can't anticipate our moves. ;)
> It means that those senators/congresscritters with a neutral or even opposing view need to be able to get a full, honest debriefing on what's being done so they can make sure that everything is legal and acceptable.
Maybe you are saying that every Senator who wants to should be briefed on any topic. And, you probably want precise procedures and consequences if they are ignored or purposely kept in the dark.
> Want real oversight? You need a group that is at least as powerful as the ones they are presiding over
But who oversees the more powerful?
There is value to this idea (it's the basis of checks and balances.. with the ultimate check performed by the People through a voting booth), but the devil is in the details. Is a strict hierarchy realistic and good or should there be more peers with complement powers?
And I should have added, we aren't necessarily going to know about the abuses, absolute power corrupts absolutely, etc -- I think those points should be part of any discussion; however, in conducting this public trial of the NSA and other public characters, we should try to be clear about what is speculation and what is actual harm shown.
Well, we are not talking just about you. The law allows virtually everyone of a certain age to drive. Multiply by tens or hundreds of millions.
And without more information, just gathering data on 2700 is near meaningless (possibly as meaningless or more so than the "tree falling in the forest with no one there to observe it"). It's what happened with that data that needs to be looked at.
> Me neither, which is a strong argument for why they need to stop [running many queries, etc].
Are you also in favor of prosecutors no longer indicting anyone or of "boys" no longer asking "girls" out on dates?
Besides the social consequences and psychological harm that is possible to the initiator, having success can also be horrible to the target in many cases since we know that innocent do go to prison and the chair and that significant other are abused and even murdered.
We can't risk trials and dating if we can't risk someone seeing something about someone they don't know and which was intended to be private.
[Has any further direct harm than this been revealed about the NSA mis-queries?]
> Right, sure there is. I'll believe it when I see [that independent and outside group].
You can be skeptical and might even be correct in your suspicions, but I'll note that it is unlikely that if such a group came about and found some success that "evidence" would be convincing to anyone who significantly doubts in the first place. I say this also considering that the nature of the study means lots of secrets will be kept from the public.
> It should be done with as much data as possible within the confines of what is allowed in the Constitution and by society.
Roughly that is what I intended. I know I didn't state that part that well and left it a bit open-ended.
> The argument is simply that the government should not be collecting all the data on everybody without regard to whether or not they have any connection to terrorist groups.
I am not sure about the following. They are collecting near all data (like emails and phone conversations) or simply near all meta-data (on email/phone)?
Don't forget we have a tradeoff. The stakes rise as technology accessible to everyone grows. There are legitimate discussions to be had on this issue and policy/law. I don't think the answers are clear-cut or absolute.
Also, the nature of technology and communication makes things messy. Having technical means to what is desired usually means you have technical means to much more.
> If an action is being taken on such a vast scale that the margin of error guarantees that thousands will be violated, then perhaps that action shouldn't be taken at all.
Yes, you are so right here. We should make driving illegal. We'll forget about the other side of the ledger and the degree of harm caused.
> the former ... the NSA pretends is of no importance.
The number of flaws themselves is not that important. The number has to be juxtaposed with the degree of harm.
As an analogy, if you make widgets and the cost to spot and recycle a broken widget is near 0, then you can afford many mistakes and should probably invest your money improving some other process. The degree of harm matters "always" since it's the product of harm*frequency (summed over all cases) that frequently really matters.
I was talking about justifying use of the word "few".
As for mistakes in general, it depends on the mistake. How many mistakes do you make daily, even just driving or writing? Do you want to give a number? What does that say about you? Might you not think you make "few" mistakes even if the count goes over 1000 yearly? The context of "percent of the whole" is germane.
Secondly, what errors are we talking about? Making a typo to get a wrong set of data and then discarding and redoing it (as might be one such scenario) is hardly the same as murdering 1000 people or even 1.
So, "few" makes sense under context, and few in this case also is not nearly as serious (from what I have read) as a murder or anything like that.
> This idea that this is a small percentage is another bit of misdirection. This is only for ONE NSA center out of bunche
If 7000 queries per minute are national (I'm using your figure), then that's 3.6 billion queries per year.
Multiply say 3,000 faults by 100 offices (I'm guessing), and that leaves you at 1/100th of 1% of the queries are problematic. Ie, for every 10,000 queries, one goes astray.
That is where "few" comes from. You have human and computer program error to deal with. And we are just talking about a bad query, not a harmful action based on that query.
> We don't have 7,000 terrorists in the US.
This reminds me of what Mike mentioned in that if you have enough queries then a small percentage can still result in serious damage.
It does perhaps suggest that there are wider goals than just terrorism.
But you aren't matching apples to apples. A single traditional murder can result in many many queries when you add all the interrogations across many people. When you are trying to solve a crime, most queries will lead to nothing. And with automated queries, you can afford to throw away many more queries for the cost and time. There is also the matter that the magnitude/nature of the crime asks greater effort be put forward, even if it lowers efficiency. Finally, the US is also concerned with terrorists in other countries and plots in other countries as these affect the US at least indirectly in various ways. OK
> Then you have the president claiming all sorts of oversight groups are included to make sure the NSA does the right things. Only to find out that's all lies too.
It's hard to get "preventive" oversight. The idea is that sooner rather than later, but frequently after the fact, that problems will be caught. In engineering, this would be akin to the difference between error correction (ie, automatic correction, aka, prevention) vs error detection. Detection is very useful and much cheaper. Frequently it is good enough. Judges do admonish prosecutors in our society even though it may be after the fact and allow the accused to be released on mistrial. If someone is harmed, they usually have recourse to a lawsuit. Evidence is tossed out by judges. Appeals do succeed in many cases. Etc.
Also, there are failures in the oversight by the 3 branches of government, but oversight does exist in some capacity.
So it's one thing to say things can be better via X Y or Z, but to speak as if the system is worthless....
Did you have a specific "lie" Obama made?
> No one gets to look over the NSA's shoulder.
There are policies established that bind them. There is some basic oversight by the other 3 branches. There are internal audits.
I think you should suggest a way to improve this weakness present in all secret intelligence gathering.
> First is the total misdirection by the NSA to all their oversight groups about any of it. Distinct and purposefully lying to cover it up, so they wouldn't be caught at it.
Congress can change the law to require numbers; however, as mentioned above, 1/100th of 1% is something many would consider can be left off the "executive summary". I do agree the query numbers can be inflated in order to hide "flaws" but Congress should be more demanding rather than expect the NSA to police itself perfectly.
I suspect many gov representatives (and citizens) are willing to give the intelligence community rope because they know their own personal security is at stake. Gov leaders are major targets of terrorists. You and I must be very unlucky to become a target but certainly can be as well.
There is infrastructure that is imperfect and many major systems that are vulnerable in various ways. Many will prefer some breech in privacy to having mass losses of life on a semi-frequent basis or to deal with the obscene amount of money to "fix" all weaknesses.
You are talking about something different (data sharing across agencies).
I agree there should be limits.
My question was about potential email/phone gathering on US citizens and the implementation of those laws with regards to internal controls succeeding or not and in consideration of the imperfections all humans and computer programs have.
I'm not trying to judge the whole law but taking bite sizes. Have the people or policies failed in a significant way (when looking at the whole) if we want to avoid as much intrusion as possible but assuming we want some of the benefits of thwarting "terrorism" or of being more easily able to take down groups trying to execute on an attack?
>> Least untruthful manner? In other words, it was a lie, but I could have told bigger lies. But he's still admitting that it was a lie.
Did he lie? Did he admit to lying? I don't think either. [Ie, we can argue the opposite is true.]
Q1: Did he lie to Congress?
First, you left important info out.
Wyden: So, what I wanted to see is if you could give me a yes or no answer to the question...
To this Clapper said "no sir"
It seems Clapper could not answer yes or no and be truthful if the question was loaded (assume he believed the question was loaded). It would be truthful for Clapper to answer "no sir" to that question, to the question on whether he could answer yes or no to a second question.
Now, while he might have meant, no sir, I can't give you a yes or no truthful answer.. he was probably trying to pick one of the 2 options that he felt was most accurate and closest to the truth to answer the embedded question. [Note, that if he was addressing the primary Wyden question, then he is being truthful if he felt the embedded question was not answerable truthfully by "yes" or "no".]
In trying to pick the best answer to the embedded question, "yes" or "no", he necessarily would have to lie or at least temporarily withhold the full truthful response.
However, he did follow up with a brief explanation, "not wittingly".
So he answered "no" to the loaded question (or perhaps even to whether he could give yes/no) and then followed up with a bit of explanation to clarify.
So where is the lie?
To have a lie, he has to believe he was hiding information or saying an untruth. Assuming he thought he was being asked about the collection of ordinary data, his full response of "no, sir, not wittingly," is then likely not a lie to Wyden.
Q2: Could Clapper possibly have thought that "any type of data at all on" Americans was not referring to meta-data but only to emails and the like?
Possibility 1: This is not an attempt to deceive if he believed "any type of data at all on" refers to data created by a person and which the intelligence agency then collects. In this case, metadata would not count but email data created by the person would.
I think Clapper would be wrong in that interpretation because of what I interpret the phrase "information on" to mean, but it's conceivable Clapper would have interpreted "information from".
Possibility 2: Alternatively, he might consider that the NSA is harvesting data not linked to any person until the point at which an effort is made to look at and interpret specific data. Eg, I might consider not to be collecting information on Mike if I have a random super-server and simply store everything that passes through it and make no effort to discern the data, some of the data which might be related to Mike. Another example is that I might keep a video on all the time, aimed at the front of my store, and saved, but I would not consider to be keeping info on Mike (or on anyone) just because Mike (or someone else) may have passed through there until I make an effort to identify data and categorize it under "Mike". Until that last point, I have no idea if I have anything on Mike or on anyone in particular. I have no bits of value associated with any person.
So, potential meta-data that has not been analyzed to actually belong to someone specific would not be data found inside any traditional dossier. Only when an effort is made to gather and order, can a dossier exist. Clapper could reasonably be ignoring unprocessed meta-data banks to not yet be data on any American.
I agree the first possibility sounds fishy and he may have been dishonest if that was his claim, but it could be difficult to "ascertain" he was lying. You would have to be in his mind, and, in the end, his story is consistent if he simply misunderstood the question from Wyden a little bit. However, the second possibility sounds reasonable to me. Again, you would have to be reading his mind or find more evidence to say with any confidence that Clapper was being dishonest with the "wife beater" interpretation of Wyden's data question.
Q3: Was the question about email?
According to Wyden it was not, but a reasonable alternative interpretation (possibility 2 above) exists.
If the meaning of a question is decided by the beholder of the question, then Clapper is as correct as Wyden; otherwise, Clapper was wrong but would not be lying if he believed his reasonable interpretation (and which actually might be the interpretation of many in intelligence gathering communities).
Q4: Could Wyden be construed to have been asking a loaded question of the wife-beating variety?
Well, if "collect" refers to *policy* of the NSA (a very reasonable interpretation of that embedded question Wyden asked), then the answer would be "no" (remember, Clapper is ignoring meta-data).
But if the question means, has the NSA *ever* collected any data..., then the answer would be "yes".
So, depending on which of the above two interpretations one takes of Wyden's question (assuming the no meta-data view), the answer would differ, although you can try to answer more thoroughly to cover each case.
And that is what Clapper ended up doing through the follow-up brief explanation.
Q5: Did Clapper admit to lying?
He said:
"I thought, though in retrospect, I was asked-- "When are you going to start-- stop beating your wife" kind of question, which is meaning not-- answerable necessarily by a simple yes or no. So I responded in what I thought was the most truthful, or least untruthful manner by saying no"
In the above context, that can hardly be considered an admission of committing perjury. I doubt anyone who believed s/he gave the most accurate answer to a loaded question is admitting guilt/perjury/lying.
Specifically, he said he gave the "most truthful, or least untruthful" reply. He didn't say he lied or committed perjury. Above, it was argued that he would not be lying if he had a certain reasonable interpretation of Wyden's question, so it would make no sense in that context to believe he was confessing to anything resembling perjury.
*****
To Summarize the argument above that can get Clapper off the hook:
Q1: Did he lie to Congress?
No. He answered correctly the question he thought he was being asked, with "no, sir, not wittingly." It's not a lie unless it is untruthful and intentional.
Q2: Could Clapper possibly have thought that "any type of data at all on" Americans was not referring to meta-data but only to emails and the like?
Yes, according to the following reasonable interpretation of Wyden's question. Random unprocessed data in bulk does not constitute a dossier on anyone. The data must be specific and linked to a person to be considered data collected on that person.
An analogous situation supports this view. Filming and storing everything in front of your store does not mean you are collecting data on "Mike" if Mike happens to pass by. You would be collecting data on Mike only when you process the bulk data and link it appropriately with a person named "Mike".
Q3: Was the question about email?
If the meaning of a question need not be unique, then Clapper can have a good argument that it was about email.
Q4: Could Wyden be construed to have been asking a loaded question of the wife-beating variety?
Yes, because two different ways to interpret his question (while also interpreting it as referring to emails) exist yet each comes with the opposite answer. "No, sir, not wittingly" answers both of these interpretations. One interpretation is solely about the policy of the NSA. The other interpretation is about the achieved results of the collection process and would include errors.
Q5: Did Clapper admit to lying?
No. He never stated literally that he lied, and it would make no sense for him to admit to something that he likely believes is not true. He admitted to giving the best answer to a loaded question. He used the words "truthful" and "untruthful" but not "lie", which is a word that means something different.
*****
I would strongly disagree that the US system of laws and enforcement today is similar to (or worse than) those of a random warlord or any other random private army.
Do you have a quote?
I ask because a lot of representatives are both for and against competing bills that are similar in content but differ in the details.
Well, at any given point in time there are an arbitrary number of rules and laws that will be deemed unconstitutional in the future. Does that necessarily mean that all of those cases currently passing as law are abuses by law enforcement?
You seem to be saying yes.
I think it's questionable and we should look more closely. In the context of the NSA spying, they changed the procedure the day that one rule was judged to be unconstitutional. In my mind that may make a difference (but I'd need more info).
> to numerous government agencies with instructions to 'launder' it so that it's harder to trace the info back to the NSA.
> > [I'll google.]
[I just realized it says "numerous" and not "foreign".]
OK, I read Mike's "IRS Also Secretly Got Intelligence Info And Was Told To Launder It" and "DEA Not Only Gets Intelligence Data, But Then Is Instructed To Cover Up Where It Gets The Info"
From the latter:
Gertner and other legal experts said the program sounds more troubling than recent disclosures that the National Security Agency has been collecting domestic phone records.
That the DEA appears to be actively covering up this information, and that it's been standard operating procedure for decades, is immensely troubling.
I found an Obama quote that probably is what this article complains about:
[Aug 9, 2013] "And if you look at the reports ? even the disclosures that Mr. Snowden has put forward ? all the stories that have been written, what you're not reading about is the government actually abusing these programs and listening in on people's phone calls or inappropriately reading people's emails. What you're hearing about is the prospect that these could be abused. Now, part of the reason they're not abused is because these checks are in place, and those abuses would be against the law and would be against the orders of the FISC."
Obama seems to be talking about programs like listening on phone calls and reading emails inappropriately.
Question: is the "laundering" a result of the programs that include emails and phone calls? [Note, Mike mentioned "decades" and the other person contrasted it to "collecting domestic phone records".]
Or is there another Obama quote that might apply to the laundering?
> Abuses like collection of data from US citizens without warrants, violating our Fourth Amendment rights.
A rule was ruled unconstitutional, but the belief prior to that was that it was not. What harm came of those instances and have the people been made whole in some way? Have these details been reported or just that some unauthorized query was performed?
To perform a query you thought was legal is not generally an "abuse"..
> Thousands of these per year.
..even thousands of queries per year or more.. more so if these were a tiny fraction of the whole. [I don't know the size of the "whole".]
> Abuses like this same data being passed along to numerous government agencies with instructions to 'launder' it so that it's harder to trace the info back to the NSA.
Can you be more specific? Was this uncovered? [I'll google.]
> As to controls, you'll need to do a bit of your own catch-up reading to see how little oversight, much less follow up on abuses, has existed.
Surely, you can mention one or two things or quotes or links, no?
BTW, I have read how other branches of government have been kept in the dark on the details, but that is a different question than to assert that NSA controls have failed to curve abuses. First, we need to come to some understanding on abuses. Maybe then we can look at how those abuses have or haven't been kept in some sort of check.
I am not saying "evil" has not happened. I am wondering about what has been uncovered, specifically wrt to abuses.
> TL;DR
If you are saying you didn't read my comment, let me draw attention to one question from it:
If you find a paper on the street with "juicy" dialog about no one you know personally and which could be fictional, would it count as an abuse for you to read it and mention those details to your spouse over dinner?
[same as parent author]
People should be able to cuss out government and what not. They should discuss fantasies/fiction even if would be illegal if acted out. We might even disagree over "goodness" of any given law and what not and might want to take our chances violating it.
I know that the government is in an asymmetrical position, eg, they have guns and legal rights to arrest us, throwing our lives out of whack, etc, and we don't to them. I don't want to downplay privacy, but we should have an idea of an abuse, based on what is read or who you are, where some other action is taken besides entering the query or reading the response that causes some form of harm. To merely read something from an unheard of person after briefly making a mistake in typing or in judgement or storing something away incorrectly but from eyes for a period of time, doesn't seem to me to be an abuse.
Abuse is to exploit something. To carry out and advantage beyond a minor amount and usually with concrete harm to someone.
Re: Know what's even scarier?
Snowden had legal access to access lots of things, I'm assuming, and access he did. The NSA would know this was a lot of material over a long time period perhaps. So they might know the worst case scenario as a decent upper bound.
Anyone with insider access from afar can do the same thing.
How easy it may or may not be for a hacker to disguise him/herself as an insider or hijack a session is a different question altogether.
[So I don't think it implies that a hacker can break in nor that a bunch of data can be touched without anyone knowing. But, independently, there appears to be a significant chance lots of people might have access to lots of data since many insiders could have been sloppy (or "sloppy") in the past. And we are not talking about Secret or any other designation besides Classified, I don't think.]