Having a picture of him with the much darker-skinned cop who was involved in all this totally undermines that whole narrative
No, it doesn't.
First, there are more than two races in this world.
Second, bigotry is not limited to racism.
It's INTRINSIC AND INSEPARABLE FROM OTHER CODE
That depends.
For example, presumably you are reading this in a Web browser. Your Web browser has an address bar, and in that address bar, you will see something like https://www.bestnettech.com/articles/.... That is a URL. It is interpreted by the Web browser and used to retrieve the HTML for this Web page (which in turn contains other URLs for things like images).
The interface used for the communication between the Web browser and the Web server is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and related protocols. These are defined via specifications and are independent from any particular implementation. A copyright on the specification would not extend to an implementation, any more than the copyright on the specification for a bolt would extend to an actual bolt.
Similarly, many programming languages (e.g., C, C++) have clear separation between interface and implementation.
Now, what harms Google here is that Java is not one of those languages. Interface is much more tightly intertwingled with implementation in Java.
> It's not just arbitrary inputs that anyone could come up with in a couple seconds.
That depends entirely on how fast you type. I certainly have defined APIs "in a couple seconds".
Few of these sites seem particularly concerned about the fact that shuttering comments makes it very clear they don't really value truly local community, and lack the willpower to nurture and protect on-site (or in app) participation.
"A right is a legally enforceable claim against another that he should do some act or refrain from doing some act"
Feel free to provide a citation to a dictionary that has that definition. Feel free to link to it, if the dictionary is online.
Reading Mark Cuban's post, and contrasting it with John Chen's post, shows that they are not describing the same thing.
Mr. Chen is focused on what I'll call "app platform neutrality", somehow requiring developers to write apps for platforms other than iOS and Android. This would be akin to requiring developers to write apps for OS X and Linux instead of just Windows, in terms of desktop operating systems.
Mr. Cuban is focused on what I'll call "app market neutrality". His concern seems less about the platform and more about the gatekeeper role that Apple plays with iOS and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Google plays with Android. He wants there to be other possible gatekeepers, in the form of having other app distribution channels be able to be peers of the App Store and Play Store. Right now, short of jailbreaking, AFAIK it is impossible to have a peer of the App Store. While peers of the Play Store exist (e.g., Amazon AppStore for Android), on Google Play-centered devices, those peers are second-class citizens. I'll be happy to go into details on the Android side, as deep as anyone wants to go.
Of course, these pale in comparison to net neutrality, for the reasons posed in this BestNetTech post and beyond. Of the two, app market neutrality comes closer to net neutrality IMHO, insofar as both are focused on the prospects of oligopolies to control content distribution.
none of what Apple or Google is doing is any change to mobile data traffic
But if you guess the 4-digit numeric passcode that 90%+ of users use to "secure" their phone? Wide open, encryption irrelevant.
So the phone still isn't really encrypted
it has a lock you can retry infinite times
FWIW, and while I hate to cite Business Insider, AMC has confirmed the MPAA's and DHS's involvement in a statement to them:
http://www.businessinsider.com/man-interrogated-by-fbi-for-wearing-prescription-google-glass-at-the-movies-2014-1?op=1
It seems like a week doesn't go by that someone doesn't launch yet another feeble over-hyped attempt to "fix email".
Invariably these projects fail to take into account decades of real-world experience
invariably, they prove to be insecure even before they're launched
a choice which nicely maximizes the attack surface available to adversaries
Nearly all of them fail to ban HTML markup, an error which isn't merely enormous, but catastrophic.
A substantial number fail to comply with BCP 38.
Ridiculous. Clearly the one-star reviews were written by ill-tempered mutated sea bass.
With frickin' laser beams attached to their heads.
Pretending to be telco astroturfers.
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.
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Oh, sorry. My bad. I just assumed that Dr. Evil had one of those razor things everyone's talking about. Y'know, given his head, and all.
One of the key arguments made with the NSA "hoovering" the metadata is that they are "third-party records" and there is no right to privacy.
However, if law enforcement tried to claim that a rented apartment was a "third-party domicile" -- arguing that since you don't own it, you have no right to privacy, and they can toss any apartment at will -- that would get thrown out without a warrant.
Similarly, if law enforcement tried to claim that a rented post office box was a "third-party communications service", and that they could rifle through those whenever they want, that too would get tossed without a warrant.
Ditto for rented storage units.
We need case law that establishes that "rented" email accounts, "rented" file manager accounts, "rented" social network accounts, "rented" phone numbers, and the like are no different than rented apartments, PO boxes, and storage units. While we are "renting" from third parties, the privacy expectation is not lost just because third parties are involved.
As I wrote previously:
The code in question is SE for Android, an Android-specific derivation of SELinux. SELinux has been part of mainstream Linux distros for a decade. While the NSA did contribute code to SELinux, SELinux is a standalone open source project with many contributors, and, more importantly, reviewers. Ditto for SE for Android.
The code in question is SE for Android, an Android-specific derivation of SELinux. SELinux has been part of mainstream Linux distros for a decade. While the NSA did contribute code to SELinux, SELinux is a standalone open source project with many contributors, and, more importantly, reviewers. Ditto for SE for Android.
So, which is more likely? That SELinux (with independent review) has a "sooper-sekrit" NSA back door, or that closed-source unreviewable OSes have them?
"which would mean the author would be forced into providing quite a few modifications that would not corrupt the original sense of the title"
As noted in another reply, 128 to 256 distinct word flips would be more than sufficient.
"What you are proposing here is some sort of human input from the author to avoid the errors that could arise from such system"
Bingo.
"As far as I can understand there is no such thing other than some modifications made by the system being shown to the authors so they can evaluate if it works well."
Or the authors coming up with the 128 to 256 occurrences themselves. That's not especially hard, and I say that as self-published author.
"But to come up with thousands or hundreds of thousands of variations that can uniquely identify a leak"
128 to 256 synonym pairs would be more than sufficient. Each represents an individual bit and can be flipped in combination.
"That's a shitload of wasted time, money and effort"
Speaking as an author, coming up with 128 to 256 synonym pairs would take me a couple of hours, tops. Remember that the algorithm involves not only the word flip, but the specific word flip. So, you come up with a pair of synonyms ("foo" and "bar"). Do a global search on the book to confirm which occurrences of "foo" can safely be switched to "bar" or vice-versa.
"Surely that's better spent working out how to make customers more willing to buy?"
Oh, I'm not saying that authors/publishers should be ignoring this. But you make it sound like this algorithm is rocket science, and it's not.
"the risk of false positives"
With 128 to 256 bits for the identity, a false positive (of the form where somebody tinkered with a copy to change the synonyms) is vanishingly unlikely. Tinkering with the book and toggling a synonym will make the book untraceable, but the odds of such a toggle happening to identify some other buyer is really tiny.
"the ease with which it can often be removed or obfuscated"
Somebody with two copies of the book could readily create a third copy that is untraceable. Few book readers would bother. Any DRM solution is toast in the face of a determined attack, and I'm not arguing otherwise.
"That's because the fingerprinting involves tampering with the integrity of the work"
That depends on your definition of "integrity" and the type of the "work".
For example, take this paragraph:
"Any publishers adopting this technique will be betraying the very books they claim to defend, by turning them from cherished friends into potential traitors. A far better approach for everyone, including the publishing industry, would be to offer more and better books at sensible prices -- with the correct, uncorrupted text."
This is nearly the same as the concluding paragraph of this post, with two word changes. The meaning of the paragraph, IMHO, is not substantially changed by those two word changes... but, then again, I am not the author of that paragraph, and so I am unqualified to make that claim.
If the book publisher works in concert with the author -- such as, for example, a self-published author -- it is eminently possible to come up with a laundry list of such synonym pairs and locations, where swapping between those words would not materially harm the work, but would represent bits to be toggled. Only the author will know which circumstances are safe to toggle without wrecking the meaning. And, of course, this will not work with all types of "works". Non-fiction will be easier than fiction, which will be easier than poetry.
So long as, in the eyes of the author, the integrity of the work is not compromised, using synonym toggle bits as a form of "soft DRM" is not significantly different than other forms of watermarking (e.g., steganographic insertion of identifiers into images), except that it is more reliable (e.g., not going to be wrecked if somebody tinkers with the images, such as by converting a book into another book format).
The point of "soft DRM" is to allow authors/publishers to more gently handle copyright infringement. Soft DRM of this type does not stop buyers from moving the book between devices, or from printing the book, etc. Mostly, it's there so that if a copy is distributed sans license, the author/publisher has some idea of who did it, so they can take appropriate steps.
And, once again, the "appropriate steps" will vary in severity, ranging from simply preventing that person from buying more books (akin to a shopkeeper refusing entry to those who have shoplifted) to full-on legal action. If you think that a lawsuit is an over-the-top response, that's an issue with the lawsuit, not with the "soft DRM" that enabled it.
So, IMHO, a blanket statement that this "involves tampering with the integrity of the work" is unsupportable. It may involve tampering, if the changes are made without author approval and if the changes do materially change the meaning of the affected passages. IOW, changing some words does not necessarily result in "corrupted text", any more than proofreading and editing the author's original words results in "corrupted text". Corruption is possible, but not a fait accompli.
It seems to me that request were made for more transparency, and they got more transparency. It isn't complete and total transparency, but it's more than before.
According to a quick glance at the report cover, they polled orcs.
(this comment is "BYO punchline")
The bill is not yet "codified into law"
Further, the bill also only refers to social media accounts used for business, and not personal Internet accounts.
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/polls-show-growing-resolve-to-live-with-terror-threat/
A timely Nate Silver piece, illustrating that "an increasing share of the public is skeptical about sacrificing personal freedoms for security."
Horse Racing
In the DA's defense, I'll argue that fantasy sports is fairly closely analogous to horse racing, with respect to whether or not it is gambling.
In both cases, there can be a measure of skill involved, such as researching past performance, particularly with respect to key factors like surface conditions (wet track/wet playing field). However, with that skill comes a large dose of luck to determine exactly who winds up winning and losing, both in the real-world performance (for the horses and the athletes) and in the betting performance.
I don't think it is unreasonable to say that these sorts of fantasy sports should fall under the same regulatory umbrella as betting on horse racing. Whether that means that it is banned (only some states allow betting on horse racing AFAIK), regulated (for those states that allow it), or free-for-all (dumping all such regulation, anyone can bet on anything) is a separate debate.